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The publication of the second edition of Peter 
Singer's Animal Liberation invites us to revisit the 
contributions of the philosopher who, more than anyone 
else, made the discussion ofanimal ethics intellectually 
respectable. Animal Liberation remains important not 
only for philosophers and activists working in this area 
but also for those interested in what a philosophical 
book can do. I say this for five reasons, which 
summarize my praise for the book. 
First, Animal Liberation (hereafter, 'AL') is 
extremely well written. To my mind, no philosopher 
writing in the English language today does it better 
than Singer. He demonstrates in AL, as always, how 
to express philosophical ideas clearly and concisely.! 
Second, Singer's arguments are exceedingly cogent. 
At times the economy of his expression leads 
superficial readers to think he has failed to defend a 
point that needs defense (e.g., why sentience is 
necessary for moral status), or argued a thesis he has 
not (e.g., that the lives of all animals are equally 
valuable). A third virtue of AL is its wealth of factual 
information relevant to the moral issues confronted-
particularly animal research and factory farming. This 
attention to factual detail is instructive because 
philosophers commonly neglect factual matters 
relevant to the moral issues they tackle. The second 
edition is particularly important for updating the reader 
fifteen years on the state of the practices under scrutiny. 
AL also serves as an example of the impact moral 
philosophy can have on the world. The book was one 
of the most significant catalysts for the modem animal 
rights movement. And it helped change the world 
precisely because it was (1) clearly written, so that 
nonphilosophers could learn from it, (2) cogently 
argued, so that philosophers might (eventually) come 
around to taking the issues seriously, and (3) bursting 
with relevant factual information, so that neither 
laypersons nor philosophers could continue to hide 
behind comfortable misconceptions. 
But the very attempt to change the world with 
reasoned arguments presupposes the Socratic attitude 
that philosophy is for U[t]hinking through, critically 
and carefully, what most of us take for granted" (AL, 
236).2 This brings us to a fifth way in which AL shows 
what a philosophy book can do: It can offer 
intellectually honest criticism of the profession itself. 
Singer exposes the widespread failure of moral 
philosophers to perform philosophy's critical task, 
noting how many leading scholars evade inevitable 
conclusions and lower their standards of argu-
mentation when considering the status of animals. For 
example, Rawls, confronted with the fact that many 
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humans, like animals, lack the sense of justice 
necessary (in his view) for the possession of moral 
rights, pleads, "I cannot examine the problem here, 
but I assume that the account of equality would not be 
materially affected" (quoted in AL, 240).3 In the 
remainder of this review I will examine the text chapter 
by chapter, before criticizing several points of Singer's 
argumentation. 
Chapter 1 contains the main philosophical argument. 
After explaining that underlying the rejection of racism 
and sexism is some fundamental moral principle of 
equality, Singer gives it the endorsement of the best 
work of his profession: 
the leading figures in contemporary moral 
philosophy have shown a great deal of 
agreement in specifying as a fundamental 
presupposition of their moral theories some 
similar requirement that works to give 
everyone's interest equal consideration (AL, 5). 
Because many animals have interests, it is possible to 
take animals into account in moral decision-making. 
And because there is no apparent reason not to take 
animals' interests into account---eertainly none that 
would exclude all animals while protecting all 
humans-animals with interests deserve equal 
consideration. In a frequently misunderstood passage, 
Singer (quite clearly, I think) explains that the fact of 
having interests is conceptually necessary and sufficient 
for moral considerability and that this entails a de/acto 
criterion of sentience: 
The capacity for suffering--or more strictly, 
for suffering and/or enjoyment or happiness-
is not just another characteristic like the 
capacity for language or higher mathematics 
.... By saying that we must consider the 
interests of all beings with the capacity for 
suffering or enjoyment Bentham does not 
arbitrarily exclude from consideration any 
interests at all-as those who draw the line 
with reference to the possession of reason or 
language do. The capacity for suffering and 
enjoyment is a prerequisite/or having interests 
at all .... A stone does not have interests 
because it cannot suffer. Nothing that we could 
do to it could possibly make any difference to 
its welfare. The capacity for suffering and 
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enjoyment is, however, not only necessary, but 
also sufficient for us to say that a being has 
interests-at an absolute minimum, an interest 
in not suffering [sentence added in this edition] 
(AL,7-8). 
Singer sidesteps the normative debate between the 
utilitarianism and rights theorists because settling the 
question of rights is unnecessary to the defense of 
animal liberation (AL, 8). He goes on to provide a series 
of arguments (somewhat updated from the fIrst edition) 
against the odd claim that animals have no interests, 
though it is noteworthy that he ignores Frey's rather 
sophisticated arguments to this conclusion.4 Having 
argued that animals feel pain and that there is no 
justification for regarding human pain as more 
important that animal pain, Singer explores the 
implications. In doing so, he emphasizes equal 
consideration, which he takes to be virtually 
uncontestable, rather than utilitarianism, the specifIc 
ethical theory to which he subscribes: 
So far as this argument is concerned nonhuman 
animals and infants and retarded humans are 
in the same category; and if we use this 
argument to justify experiments on nonhuman 
animals we have to ask ourselves whether we 
are also prepared to allow experiments on 
human infants and retarded adults; and if we 
make a distinction between animals and these 
humans, on what basis can we do it, other than 
a bare-faced-and morally indefensible-
preference for our own species (AL, 16)? 
Before concluding the chapter, Singer explains that 
equal consideration does not entail that all lives are of 
equal value, thereby highlighting the important 
distinction between equal consideration and equal 
treatment. (Because the case for liberating animals from 
our major animal-exploiting institutions can be made 
by appeal to suffering alone, he considers this issue 
secondary.) Equal consideration entails that "beings 
who are similar in all relevant respects have a similar 
right to life-and mere membership in our own 
biological species cannot be a morally relevant criterion 
for this right" (AL, 19). Unlike S. F. Sapontzis, but like 
Tom Regan and James Rachels, Singer ends up with a 
view that implies that human lives are ordinarily more 
valuable than animal lives: 
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While self-awareness, the capacity to think 
ahead and have hopes and aspirations for the 
future, the capacity for meaningful relations 
with others and so on are not relevant to the 
question of inflicting pain-since pain is pain 
.. , -these capacities are relevant to the 
question of taking life. It is not arbitrary to 
hold that the life of a self-aware being, capable 
ofabstract thought, of planning for the future, 
ofcomplex acts ofcommunication, and so on, 
is more valuable than the life of a being 
without these capacities (AL, 20). 
Chapter 2 is a discussion of the use of animals in 
research. The wealth of details (including much that 
is new to this edition), the doubts cast on the usefulness 
of most research, the descriptions of alternatives to 
research, and the exposure of the disingenuous way 
in which researchers have sold themselves to the 
public, all add up to as convincing a case against 
animal research as I have read. Singer summarily tells 
us that of "the tens of millions of experiments 
performed, only a few can possibly be regarded as 
contributing to important medical research" (AL, 40). 
.His conclusion about psychological research is 
particularly scathing: 
what is so disturbing about the examples of 
research given above is that despite the suffering 
the animals have gone through, the results 
obtained, even as reported by the experimenters 
themselves, are trivial, obvious, or meaningless. 
The conclusions of the experiments cited above 
show ... that experimental psychologists have 
put a lot of effort into telling us in scientific 
jargon what we knew all along, and what we 
could have found out in less harmful ways with 
little thought-and these experiments were 
supposedly more significant that others that did 
not get published (AL, 49-50). 
Among the details presented are many that are 
striking-e.g., the fact that U. S. regulations do not even 
cover mice and rats, the most commonly used species. 
Later in the chapter Singer confronts the question 
of whether the use of research animals is ever justified. 
His answer exemplifies once more the prudent strategy 
of relying on equal consideration instead of the more 
specific and controversial standpoint of utilitarianism: 
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Would we be prepared to let thousands of 
humans die if they could be saved by a single 
experiment on a single animal? 
This question is, of course, purely 
hypothetical. There has never been and never 
could be a single experiment that saved 
thousands of lives. The way to respond to this 
hypothetical question is to pose another: 
Would the experimenters be prepared to carry 
out their experiment on a human orphan under 
six months old if that were the only way to 
save thousands of lives (AL, 81)? 
His utilitarian colors do appear later, however. In 
response to the above question, he states that it "will 
not do to say 'Never! n, (AL, 85), before elaborating: 
I do not believe that it could never be justifiable 
to experiment on a brain-damaged human. If 
it really were possible to save several lives by 
an experiment that would take just one life, 
and there were no other way those lives could 
be saved, it would be right to do the experiment 
But this would be an extremely rare case. 
Certainly none of the experiments described 
in this chapter could pass the test (AL, 85). 
This passage fairly clearly establishes Singer's view as 
act-utilitarian, a point to which I will return later. 
Singer's good sense is revealed in the way in which 
he stands back from the institution of animal research 
and views it in its proper perspective. He ridicules, for 
example, our ineffectual fight against cancer: 
Although tens of thousands of animals have 
been forced to inhale tobacco smoke for 
months and even years, the proof of the 
connection between tobacco use and lung 
cancer was based on data from clinical 
observations in human beings. The United 
States government continues to pour billions 
of dollars into research on cancer, while it 
also subsidizes the tobacco industry (AL, 88). 
At the end of the chapter the big picture is mor~d 
more painfully-evident: 
the major health problems of the world 
largely continue to exist, not because we do 
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not know how to prevent disease and keep 
people healthy, but because no one is putting 
enough effort and money into doing what we 
already know how to do. The diseases that 
ravage [the poor around the world] are 
diseases that, by and large, we know how to 
cure.... It has been estimated that 250,000 
children die each week around the world, and 
that one quarter of these deaths are by 
dehydration caused by diarrhea. A simple 
treatment, already known and needing no 
animal experimentation, could prevent the 
deaths of these children. Those who are 
genuinely concerned about improving health 
care would probably make a more effective 
contribution to human health if they left the 
laboratories and saw to it that our existing 
stock of medical knowledge reached those 
who need it most (AL, 92). 
The third chapter, which discusses factory farming, 
continues the onslaught of horrifying details depicting 
the realities of our treatment of animals. It is updated 
from the first edition in several respects. For example, 
it discusses Marian Dawkins' recent efforts to use 
behavioral evidence to establish rigorously the 
preferences of animals presented with certain choices 
(AL, 117). It also highlights some progressive 
suggestions by the European Parliament on how to 
improve the welfare of animals on factory farms (AL, 
143), and describes how Sweden is leading the way 
with reforms (AL, 144). No description of this chapter 
could be complete without offering some sense of the 
detailed account it provides of factory farming. Here 
is one sampling, which describes the castration of bulls: 
Anesthetics are generally not used. The 
procedure is to pin the animal down, take a 
knife, and slit the scrotum, exposing the 
testicles. You then grab each testicle in tum 
and pull on it, breaking the cord that attaches 
to it; on older animals it may be necessary to 
cut the cord (AL, 145). 
A second passage describes ritual slaughter in the U. S.: 
[What follows] is the result of a combination 
of the requirements of ritual slaughter and of 
the Pure Food and Drug Act of 1906, which 
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for sanitary reasons stipulates that a 
slaughtered animal must not fall in the blood 
of a previously slaughtered animal .... 
[A} nimals being ritually slaughtered in the 
United States may be shackled around a rear 
leg, hoisted into the air, and then hang, fully 
conscious, upside down on the conveyor belt 
for between two and five minutes-and 
occasionally much longer if something goes 
wrong on the "killing line"-before the 
slaughterer makes his cut (AL, 154). 
Chapter 4, which concerns the moral issue of 
vegetarianism, contains some points of philosophical 
and factual interest. Singer begins by arguing-
probably (in part) against the position of Frey5-that 
while it may be logically consistent to oppose the 
present conditions of factory farming while continuing 
to eat factory-farmed meat, to do so would be 
psychologically very difficult and probably impractical 
(AL, 159). For those who, like Frey, wonder whether 
one's own boycotting efforts can be known to have 
any actual effect on the industry, this is a serious 
issue-that is, if one is a utilitarian, for then one 
justifies one's actions in terms ofexpected consequences. 
Singer rightly notes that "none of the great movements 
against oppression and injustice could have existed if 
their leaders had made no efforts until they were 
assured of success" (AL, 163). (This fact, it seems to 
me, provides strong grounds for some type of moral 
rule requiring participation in cooperative efforts 
needed to defeat serious injustices. It is notentirely 
clear that act-utilitarianism vindicates such a rule; if 
not, I take that to be a deficiency of act-utilitarianism.) 
But Singer also thinks our individual efforts do reduce 
demand, thereby saving some animals from suffering 
and death, even if our actions are not part of a 
collective effort that succeeds in abolishing factory 
farming (AL, 163-164). 
On the topic of traditional farming, Singernotes that 
even these comparatively humane methods involve 
"castration, separation of mother and young, breaking 
up of social groups, branding, transportation to the 
slaughterhouse, and finally slaughter itself' (AL, 160). 
Even if animals could be reared without these causes 
of suffering, that would be possible only on a small 
scale, resulting in vastly higher meat prices and the 
impossibility of feeding our huge urban populations 
(AL, 160). From a practical standpoint, this obviates 
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the issue of whether the painless killing of animals for 
food is justified (AL, 160). 
Chapter S, an engaging history of speciesism, will 
have to be passed over. 
Chapter 6, "Speciesism Today," contains excellent 
arguments against common rationalizations for the 
exploitation of animals. I include two examples. To 
counter the claim that life in a factory farm is preferable 
to the dangers awaiting animals in the wild, Singer 
argues the following: 
Factory farm animals cannot walk, run, 
stretch freely, or be part of a family or herd. 
True, many wild animals die from adverse 
conditions or are killed by predators; but 
animals kept in farms do not live for more than 
a fraction of their normal life span either. The 
steady supply of food is not an unmitigated 
blessing, since it deprives animals of their most 
basic natural activity, the search for food. The 
result is a life of utter boredom, with nothing 
at all to do but lie in a stall and eat (AL, 227). 
More likely to be overlooked is the fact that the choice 
between living on factory farms and living in the wild 
is illusory; abolishing factory farms would not mean 
returning animals to their natural habitat. It would 
mean that animals would no longer be bred for factory 
farms (AL, 227). 
Nor can it be argued that animals are better off 
factory-farmed than nonexistent; to bring them into 
existence with that quality of life is no benefit to them, 
"but rather a great harm" (AL, 229). Singer concedes 
that animals with no sense of the future might be 
benefited by being brought into existence, if they live 
on free-range farms and are killed quickly and 
painlessly. But even to those who would invoke such 
ingenious grounds for selective meat-eating, Singer has 
a brilliant retort: 
If it were good to bring things into existence 
then presumably, other things being equal, we 
ought to bring as many humans as possible 
into existence too; and if to this we add the 
view that human lives are more important than 
the lives of animals-a view the flesh-eater 
seems sure to accept-then the argument may 
be turned on its head .... Since more humans 
may be fed if we do not feed our grain to 
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livestock [as Singer demonstrated earlier], the 
upshot of the argument is, after all, that we 
ought to become vegetarians (AL, 230)! 
AL concludes with Appendices for further reading, 
tips on getting by without the products of animal 
exploitation, and organizations for animal welfare. 
Let me tum at this point to criticisms of the book. 
My criticisms may take us deeper into philosophical 
theory than Singer wished to go in AL; indeed, Singer 
indicates that he does not regard his book as one of 
academic philosophy (AL, x). Nevertheless, he also 
says, "I have come across no insurmountable objections, 
nothing that has led me to think that the simple ethical 
arguments on which the book is based are anything but 
sound" (AL, xi). This would seem to make it fair game 
to subject his "simple arguments" to criticisms at any 
level of sophistication. 
To begin with, Singer fails to address respectable 
criticisms ofequal consideration, and has not explained, 
in any detail, what equal consideration amounts to. One 
challenge, which is widely held and might be called 
"the argument from social bondedness," is well stated 
by Mary Midgley. In a qualified endorsement of the 
idea that the needs of those closest to us have moral 
priority over the needs of those less close, she invokes 
social bondedness: "The special interests which parents 
feel in their own children is not a prejudice, nor is the 
tendency which most of us would show to rescue, in a 
fire or other emergency, those closest to US."6 By way 
of analogy she argues that a preference for our own 
species is acceptable but has limits, in no way 
justifying the complete dismissal of animals' interests. 
Thus, her view accommodates some degree of unequal 
consideration. 
While, like Singer, I am a champion of equal 
consideration, I think far more needs to be said about 
this principle to provide a philosophically adequate 
defense of it. Midgley's strongest case is priority given 
to one's children. A Singerian response would be that 
the righUless of such priority is explicable by the greater 
long-term efficiency of such partiality, since children 
are better cared for if parents focus greater concern on 
their own. However, many clear-thinking philosophers 
will not be satisfied by this account, believing that the 
nature of the relationship of parent to child justifies 
preferential treatment. Like W. D. Ross, they will insist 
that, even if long-term utility vindicates such 
discrimination (so that equal consideration is also 
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vindicated), this fact is simply fortuitous for the 
champion ofequal consideration; the morality ofgiving 
priority to one's children is not contingent on its 
efficiency.? 
A second challenge to equal consideration is what I 
call the "sui generis view." Justifications for what 
counts as a morally relevant characteristic or fact about 
a being, the argument goes, have to end somewhere; 
logic alone cannot decide what counts as relevant. The 
champion of equal consideration and her opponent 
simply differ on what facts are relevant. Some examples 
will clarify the general point being made about ethical 
justification. 
Rationalists believe that reasons justifying correct 
moral judgments can be provided up to the point at 
which it can be shown that denying the judgment would 
involve a logical error (or perhaps some other form of 
irrationality). Others believe that self-interest is the 
only secure anchor for an ethical position. Still others 
hold that neither formal rationality nor self-interest is 
capable of grounding moral judgments, but that there 
are certain objective moral axioms that one either 
recognizes or does nOl. 8 For the "sui generis 
inegalitarian," being human just is. sui generis, a 
morally relevant characteristic that grounds preferential 
treatment. The argument for the relevance of being 
human goes no further than that; it is no contradiction 
to hold the opposite view. While many champions of 
equal consideration invoke traits that cut across species 
lines (as Singer and I do), no logical demonstration is 
ever (or could be) offered that species membership per 
se is morally irrelevant. Singer nearly confronts this 
view inAL, but ends up saying "any satisfactory defense 
of the claim that all and only human beings have 
intrinsic dignity [ i.e., deserve greater consideration] 
would need to refer to some relevant capacities or 
characteristics that only human beings have" (AL, 239). 
As a point of philosophical logic, it is false that one 
must invoke traits beyond being human to claim that 
humans deserve greater consideration. I tentatively 
agree that no satisfactory defense of unequal 
consideration would fail to adduce further 
characteristics, but Singer seems blind to issues that an 
adequate defense of equal consideration would treat. 
In fact, until recently, Singer apparently thought equal 
consideration was a logically necessary feature ofmoral 
language.9 
Singer also fails to explain what equal consideration 
amounts to. What is the criterion for one's interests 
being identical to another? An answer is needed to 
determine, in some difficult cases, whether certain 
interests of different beings must be given equal 
consideration. For example, Singer believes that 
different lives may have different values; he states that 
it "is not arbitrary to hold that the life of a self-aware 
being, capable of abstract thought, of planning for the 
future, of complex acts of communication, and so on, 
is more valuable than the life of a being without these 
capacities" (AL, 20). I assume this means that the life 
of a normal adult human and that of a mouse are not to 
be given equal consideration, for, if one must choose 
between them, one should, on this view, save the human. 
The likely response is that they need not be given equal 
consideration because what is at stake is not the same-
two different interests, or bundles of interests, are being 
compared. Fine, but what determines whether two 
interests, or sets of interests, are identical, or sufficiently 
similar that equal consideration applies to them? This 
issue is important also in considering the interest of not 
being confined. Is a normal human's interest in not 
being confined such that it should be given equal 
consideration to, say, a goldfish's interest is not being 
confined? The answers, at least when considering 
mammals might have some implications for animal 
research.10 
We noted above that Singer is an act-utilitarian. 
(This view usually lurks in the background ofAL, since, 
again, Singer puts most of his arguments' normative 
weight on equal consideration.) This is not the place to 
review the many objections lodged against act-
utilitarianism (AU), but I will briefly mention a few. 
As we have seen, it is at least not obvious that AU 
vindicates a rule requiring cooperative efforts against 
major injustices, or preferential treatment toward one's 
own children. Far more obvious is that these should be 
vindicated. Moreover, AU seems to require in certain, 
perhaps very rare or even hypothetical circumstances, 
that ajudge knowingly condemn an innocent person to 
death, that one kill an innocent person to save two (not 
a thousand) people, that one even rape or torture a child 
when, using one's best estimates, doing so would cause 
more (not necessarily far more) good than harm. 
Defenders of AU have come up with clever 
responses to such objections. Sometimes they vindicate 
the intuition that a particular action is wrong but argue 
thatAU does not endorse it. In some cases it is claimed 
that the situation described in the objection will never 
occur in the real world. For example, it might be said 
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that maximizing utility will never justify enormously 
unequal distributions of basic goods to different groups 
of people, some of whom are left in misery. While 
such a situation is imaginable, they say, utilitarians are 
only responsible for the real world. 
But notice, first, that in such cases the wrongness of 
such actions usually seems far more certain than any 
ethical theory. So, ifAU vindicates the seemingly right 
action in the end, that is, as it were, lucky for AU. 
Second, would it not be strange if AU were true for our 
world but false for worlds that are, after all, not so 
different from ours? (Remember that, in many cases, 
it is unclear whether AU requires a seemingly wrong 
act in our world, or only in other worlds.) The point is 
that the efforts to defend AU against objections like 
these seem so strained that one wonders why anyone 
bothers. What is so great about AU? 
Before answering, it is important to note that Singer 
does not think moral intuitions have any credibility, 
that they are anything but appeals to bias.u (By 
"intuition" I mean a judgment that is justified by its 
seeming to be correct, whether or not further argument 
could justify it.) One might wonder what could 
reasonably overrule our strongest reflective moral 
convictions (which, by definition, have been examined 
. for possible bias).12 Now, surely there is one possible 
foundation of morality that, if it does its job, provides 
our answer: reason (say, appeal to facts and logic). If 
reason can demonstrate that (1) we should be moral 
(solving the "is-ought problem") and that (2) we 
should follow a particular ethical theory, then there is 
no need to appeal to intuition. But rationalism in this 
sense has been widely rejected. 
However, Singer believes that reason provides a 
foundation for ethics and, specifically, AU. His 
melaethics is based on the work of R. M. Hare.13 Singer 
is aware of what is at stake: "If [Hare's argument is 
right], his work must rank as the most important result 
of recent ethics, perhaps even as the culmination of all 
Western moral philosophy."14 Hare's famous argument 
is based on the claim that moral language is necessarily 
prescriptive and universal (the latter feature underlying 
equal consideration). I cannot outline his ingenious case 
here or take up the major objections against it. (I must 
confess, though, that when a philosopher announces the 
discovery of a rational foundation for ethics and for a 
particular moral theory, I feel almost as I do when I 
hear of a "proof' for the existence of God.) But I do 
think that some of the objections are successful. 15 In 
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fairness to Singer, since I cannot explore objections here, 
let me just say that if he is right about Hare's 
contribution, then appeals to intuition in ethics are 
unwarranted and AU is correct. But if Hare's case 
fails--in the absence of a rational demonstration for 
the truth of some moral theory-we seem to be left with 
little reason to castigate the discriminating use of 
intuition in ethics, and just as little reason to accept 
AU, with all of its counterintuitive implications. 
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(p. 157) (see discussion of the "sui generis view" above); he 
thinks instead that such a restriction is arbitrary. While he 
imagines a counter to the charge of arbitrariness (pp. 158-159), 
the interlocutor is not very resourceful. In any event, Singer's 
supplemental argumentation cannot save Hare's theory if the 
latter fails for other reasons, as I (and most other moral 
philosophers) think. 
15 For some weighty arguments against Hare's view, see R. 
B. Brandt, "Act-Utilitarianism and Metaethics,"Thomas Nagel, 
'The Foundations of Impartiality," and Bernard Williams, 'The 
Structure of Hare's Theory," in Hare and Critics. 
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Peter Singer 
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My first reaction, on reading David DeGrazia's 
review of the second edition of Animal Liberation, 
was to applaud, He has located the strengths and 
weaknesses of the book with a rare precision. If his 
praise is too generous, I shall leave it to others to take 
him to task over that. To me, it is particularly pleasing 
because it is not the praise of an uncritical admirer. 
Nor did my urge to applaud fade away when I turned 
to the final, most critical, section of the review, for 
here I found DeGrazia's criticisms do indeed point to 
aspects of the book's argument that are, at best, 
incompletely developed. 
DeGrazia is right to say that some of his criticisms 
go more deeply into philosophical theory than I wanted 
to do in AL. When I came to write the second edition, I 
knew that there was now a mass of sophisticated 
philosophical literature on the topic that had not existed 
when I wrote the fIrst edition. At fIrst I planned to respond 
to it, but I soon realized that if I were to do so, I would be 
writing a different, and much less readable, book. That 
was something I did not want to do. I vaguely intend to 
write a comprehensive "reply to my critics" on some 
future occasion; meanwhile other projects fill my time, 
projects more stimulating and, I think, more fruitful than 
the tedious prospect of exposing the flaws in a volley of 
objections, some of which are of interest only insofar as 
they provide evidence of the lengths to which intelligent 
people with philosophical training can goin order to avoid 
the need to change their diet. 
I do not, however, include in the scope of that last 
sentence the difficulties to which DeGrazia points in 
the final part of his review. The matters to which he 
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